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This experiment is a preliminary test to explain the participation effect observed in Bortolami 
and Mittone (2009). The aim of this new version is to test whether the contributory gap is more 
properly justifiable in terms of pure environmental choices, or, on the contrary, whether the gap 
is more strictly related to behavioural dynamics. To verify the former hypothesis, an 
environmental change regarding communication is introduced. To test the latter, empirical and 
normative expectations are explicitly considered. 
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1.   Introduction 
The experiments in Bortolami and Mittone (2009) show that the way by which a 
sanctioning/rewarding rule is implemented in a public good game significantly affects the level 
of individual contributions. They compare the effect of two different enactment procedures: a 
self-determination modality and an imposition modality of the same rule to control free riding. 
From a purely theoretical perspective, the same rules should deter opportunistic behaviour with 
the same efficacy, and only different rules are expected to generate different efficiency, for 
example according to their severity (as in Decker, Stiehler & Strobel 2003). 
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Bortolami and Mittone observe that whenever a group participates actively in the determination 
of a sanctioning/rewarding rule, the levels of individual contributions are significantly greater 
than those obtained in a group that simply receives the same norm, taking all other conditions as 
fixed. 
Moreover, the participation effect is displayed with a domain of rules that never alter the 
dominance of free riding behaviour. In other words, Bortolami and Mittone choose a set of 
parameters that cannot generate rules strong enough to make the contribution the dominant 
strategy (as for instance in Tyran and Feld, 2006). 
Bortolami and Mittone’s experimental design consists of two games in succession, the first is 
called the Basic Game (a linear public good game) and the second is called the Basic Game with 
Rule (the same Basic Game, but now played with the sanctioning/rewarding rule). After having 
played the Basic Game, the experimental group (constituent group) proceeds by creating the 
sanctioning/rewarding rule. This enactment procedure is called the Rule Phase, which consists 
of a combination of discussion and voting stages. The final rule is an arrangement of five 
elements that the constituent group determines step-by-step. The rule is then implemented in the 
Basic Game of both the constituent group and of a control group (recipient group). Since the 
rule is determined in the constituent group, Bortolami and Mittone define this procedure as 
endogenous enactment (or self-determination). To the contrary, the control group merely 
receives the rule, so that this is termed exogenous enactment (or imposition). 
Bortolami and Mittone initially study whether a participation effect exists. After having 
observed such behavioural regularity, they quote three different classes of possible explanatory 
elements. The first concerns the enactment procedure in itself, deeming the vote, discussion and 
decomposition modality to play a potential influence. The second class regards several 
hypotheses about different conformity expectations generated within groups. Finally, they quote 
a set of social-psychological dynamics associated with participation, such as the group goal 
effect, the closeness effect and the inner coherence effect. 
None of the aforementioned possible classes is directly tested in Bortolami and Mittone. This 
paper instead directly investigates whether the gap may be explained in terms of two specific 
elements: communication modality and/or in terms of different contributory expectations 
generated in the groups. In order to isolate the role of these potential variables, the initial 
experimental design in Bortolami and Mittone (2009) is properly modified. This new 
formulation in the experimental design is named “Software Version”. 
The remaining part of the paper is organized as follows: Section 2 provides the modifications of 
the experimental environment; Section 3 describes the new experimental design; Section 4   3
presents the experimental results; Section 5 discusses the main findings and finally Section 6 
concludes. 
 
2.   The software version 
2.1   The role of the communication modality 
The only main (and possibly) relevant difference between the environment of the standard 
version in Bortolami and Mittone (2009) and that of the software version lies in the way by 
which players can communicate. In the present new version, we have introduced Computer 
Mediated Communication (CMC) by the use of a chat.  
CMC by chat aims at verifying whether the participation effect is affected (or explained) by the 
way used to communicate within groups. As largely accepted by scholars (see for instance Isaac 
& Walker, 1988), it is not only the mere presence of communication that is an important 
element in achieving a cooperative level of contribution: but also the medium by which 
communication is realized may have interesting consequences. The main result observed in the 
literature is that face-to-face communication is potentially stronger than impersonal 
communication, since the former implies more meta-factors that may reinforce the 
communication device. Importantly, scholars deem the face-to-face medium to be relevant even 
in contexts where psychical interaction is reduced. Brosing et al. (2003) suggest that visual and 
active interactions are equally important elements that affect both contribution levels and 
cooperation stability.  
Following the definition of Brosing et al., our chat is both non-verbal interaction (i.e. people 
communicate by writing), and active communication, since our players can exchange opinions 
and reply to each other’s communication. Furthermore, our chat maintains the anonymity 
condition, since players enter the chat by their Identity Codes (ID). From this perspective, our 
chat is similar, but not identical, to their individualization treatment (in which players can see 
the other players for just ten seconds)
2. Neither their lecture nor their audio conference 
treatments correspond to our chat: in fact, our players do not listen to the content of the chat. 
Their video-conferencing treatment is different from our chat: our players cannot physically 
establish “who said what” (i.e. they cannot associate the ID in the chat and the “real” identity of 
the player). 
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The aforementioned characteristics allow us to consider our chat as an original one, when 
compared to Brosing’s et al. (2003) communication media. Consequently, we cannot expect to 
obtain exactly the same results as in their experiments. Nevertheless, several other studies may 
suggest the direction of our chat effect. For instance, Bochet et al. (2006) observe that both 
types of communication -i.e. face-to-face and CMC by chat- improve the level of contribution. 
More importantly, the level of public good provided does not significantly differ between the 
two media. From this perspective, we may expect the same contributory effect as well in our 
experimental test. However, a direct experimental test on our chat is needed, given the 
specificity of our environment.  
Moreover, outside the public good game literature, there is an open debate among socio-
psychological scholars about the effect of CMC. Broadly speaking, the debate concerns scholars 
who assert that there are important differences between CMC and face-to-face communication, 
and scholars who argue the equivalence of such communication media. 
The first class of studies deems face-to-face communication to be the best vehicle to spread 
social norms within a group. To this end, they stress the role of real and concrete social 
interaction to build up social identity and group responsibility. In this sense, CMC is an artificial 
device, which both alienates individuals from their real social context, and weakens social cues. 
This approach is defined as Reduced Social Cues (RSC). Consequently, CMC may degenerate 
into so-called de-individualization, which may have the same effects as anonymity (see, for 
example, Sproull & Kiesler, 1991). In the context of social problems, like the public good, this 
de-individualisation could amplify the anti-social phenomena, such as free riding.  
The so-called SIDE approach (Social Identity-De-individualization) belongs to the second 
debated class. These studies acknowledge two different identity types: the personal identity 
(unique for each individual), and the social identity (any individual has several social identities, 
according to different social contexts). Following this perspective, the effect of CMC is strictly 
related to the context where the communication takes place. In other words, specific contexts 
highlight different social norms, which may elicit different social identities (see, for example, 
Spears, Postmes, Lea, & Wolbert, 2002). Therefore, it is possible that, in certain contexts, CMC 
implies hyper-social behaviour, even more cooperative than the face-to-face medium. The latter 
consideration is chiefly analyzed in the so-called SIP (Social Information Processing), where 
authors deem CMC to also elicit social stereotypes. In this regard, Walther (1996) asserts that 
asynchronous communications
3 may lead to such stereotyped characterization. From this 
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perspective, both face-to-face communication and CMC by chat are synchronic 
communications, but the latter may maintain the anonymous condition.  
Considering the aforementioned results, we may expect that the introduction of CMC 
communication should not completely nullify the positive gap between constituent and recipient 
groups. In other words, we assume that the mere possibility to communicate dominates the 
communication modality. Nevertheless, since we suspect that the positive gap is also due to 
inner group dynamics, we cannot exclude  at the beginning  the specificity of face-to-face 
communication, as claimed by the pure CMC theory, or by Isaac and Walker (1988). Put 
differently, previous experimental studies suggest the equivalence between face-to-face 
communication and CMC, since no significant difference in the level of public good provided 
has been found. Our specific experimental design, however, is not perfectly comparable to such 
studies. Consequently, we cannot be sure that the equivalence of the media in our case. Hence, a 
first experiment is run to verify whether the change of communication modality is relevant to 
the level of public good provided. To this end, we have formulated the following experimental 
question: 
Does computer-mediated communication (by chat) nullify the contributory gap between 
constituent group and recipient group? 
If the answer is “yes”, we will explain the participating effect in terms of the communication 
medium. In this case, we should consider in more depth the reason why face-to-face 
communication significantly affects our gap. 
If the answer is “no”, we will seek other possible factors to explain why direct participation in a 
normative procedure yields a higher level of contribution in the constituents groups. 
Although we include CMC to verify whether the participation effect is influenced, it is 
interesting to note that the insertion of the chat makes our environment comparable to Dickson’s 
et al. experiment (2007). These authors highlight the importance of the content of 
communication in the presence of heterogeneous agents. The chat allows us to monitor the 
communication networks, that is, we can observe both the person who speaks and the one who 
listens, and the content of the communication. This may be interesting to reveal whether 
communication is effectively cheap talk or whether, on the contrary, it has a strategic meaning 
or a persuasive effect. Nevertheless, this analysis has to be postponed to future research, since 
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both sender and receiver, for example, the classical face-to-face communication, or a telephone 
communication. In the CMC context, chat is an example of synchronous communication. Nevertheless, 
the way in which people gather information by communication is different. In face-to-face 
communication there is generally one sender and one (or multiple) receiver. On the contrary, in chat 
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our environment does not allow us to relate personal communication and effective contribution, 
for at least two reasons. The first concerns a general problem of our chat: individual messages 
appear in sequence and sometimes it is not possible to link individual answers and their related 
questions.
4 The second reason regards the step-by-step procedure in the Rule-Phase, where there 
are five chats. The correspondence between individual communication and final contribution is 
fragmented and, consequently, a clear and immediate relationship cannot be established. 
 
2.2   The Role of Expectations 
In this software version, we have introduced another element of novelty, that is a questionnaire 
provided at the end of the first round in the Basic Game with Rule (BG+R), but before the 
announcement of the total aggregate level of public good. This questionnaire represents a hybrid 
method to test whether contributions are related to expectations and, possibly, whether different 
contributions between constituent and recipient groups are due to different expectations. 
The questionnaire is distributed at the moment of the BG+R for two main reasons. Firstly, 
we do not aim to change completely the experimental design, in order to maintain (where 
possible) the comparability of this new version to the standard one. From this perspective, we 
have still not introduced any specification about the “types” of players and, hence, we are 
focusing again on the aggregate effect of normative participation.  
Secondly, we suppose that the first round may be the moment when expectations about 
conformity (i.e. about the contributions of the others) are mainly exempt from the subsequent 
game dynamics.  
Our method is a not the mere application of an already-existing example in the literature. To 
be more precise, our method is a hybrid of at least three different approaches. The first coincides 
with the specification in Bicchieri (2006), that is, we include her definition of expectation by 
means of normative and empirical expectations. The second defines our core of analysis as in 
Croson et al. (2006), that is, we consider the individual average contributions as an anchor of 
personal updating. Finally, our distinction between empirical and normative expectations may 
be a parallel to Dufwenberg’s et al. (2006) distinction between first- and second-order beliefs.  
In particular, our experimental modification should directly test whether Bicchieri and 
Xiao’s (2007) specific statement about free riding and compliance is concretely observed in our 
results. The authors deem empirical expectations to be insufficient to make people comply. To 
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this end, they report free riding to be the typical example. When compliance in public goods 
means to abide by a contributory norm, the expectation of the positive contributions of the 
others (i.e. empirical expectations) increases the incentive to free ride. Consequently, the 
authors assert this type of expectation-alone- does not support conformity behaviour in public 
good games. They suggest the introduction of normative expectations, that is, individual 
expectations about the expectations of the others about proper conformity (more precisely, what 
the individual believes others think ought to be done).  
When applied to our framework, Bicchieri and Xiao’s position is quite general, since it does 
not take into account whether the way by which norms are enacted may affect individual 
expectations of conformity and, henceforth, individual contributions. Nevertheless, it is 
important to stress that their study concerns dictator games and not public good games. In fact, 
the authors do not explicitly clarify which kind of expectations is predicted to occur in case of 
free riding. 
The classical theoretical hypothesis deems free riders to have exogenous expectations. 
Furthermore, free riders have a unique dominant strategy in null contributions, independently of 
the contributions of the others. In cases where free riders expect positive contributions, theory 
asserts that they will free ride more (as in the case of positive Nash conjectures). If we assume 
that expectations affect behaviour (as in Offerman, 1997; Offerman, Sonnemans & Schram, 
2001) and not vice-versa, we may formulate the theoretical free riding prediction following 
Bicchieri’s approach, i.e. distinguishing between empirical expectations (E.E) and normative 
expectations (N.E). However, a pure theoretical perspective does not introduce any separation 
between expectations, since any representative agent (perfectly rational) will never contribute, 
independently of his expectations. A possible translation of the theoretical expectations may be 
realized as follows: 
∀ ) ( . i i q E E −  and  )) ( ( . j i i q E E N − − ∀ ,       0 = i q      [1] 
Where  ) ( . i i q E E −  is individual i's empirical expectation about the average of the others’ 
contributions. The normative expectation,  )) ( ( . j i i q E E N − − , concerns individual i's expectation 
about what he thinks the others will expect on average. In this perspective, the theoretical 
expectation in [1] finds a more direct analogy between Bicchieri’s definition and first and 
second order beliefs.  
The specification of what “one ought to do” is related to expectations of conformity, i.e, with 
the expectation of the others’ contributions. Suppose that complying with the norm means 
simply to contribute, then the conformity expectations in [1] may be specified as follows:   8
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Case [2] expresses the consistency of the direction between empirical expectations and 
normative expectations. Individual conformity follows such consistency when the agent 
positively contributes too, that is: 
0 ) ( . > −i i q E E  and  0 )) ( ( . > − − j i i q E E N  yields       0 > i q               [3] 
To the contrary, the incentive to free ride may be formalized as follows: 
0 ) ( . > −i i q E E ,  0 )) ( ( . > − − j i i q E E N  yields            0 = i q               [4] 
In our environment, the conformity threshold is exogenously determined, that is, people do not 
comply with the contributory norm whenever their contribution belongs to the range  4 0 ≤ ≤ i q  
( 4 ≤ i q )
5. To the contrary, we consider as conforming behaviours all the contributions 
belonging to the range  10 5 ≤ ≤ i q  ( 5 ≥ i q ).  
If one assumes that the same norm has the same effect independently of its enactment, the 
level of contributions should be the same between constituent and recipient groups. To the 
contrary, in the standard version Bortolami and Mittone observe a gap, which they relate to the 
participation effect. To test whether this gap is supported by expectation considerations, we may 
follow two different hypotheses. The first concerns different conformity expectations between 
groups, whereas the second concerns different uses of such expectations. Since we are 
considering a group effect rather than an individual perspective, we consider average 
expectations between groups.  
Assuming that empirical and normative expectations have the same direction (i.e. they are 
consistent, following Bicchieri’s perspective), we may formalize the first hypothesis as follows:  
H1.  ) ( . 1 q E E Gr ,  ) ( . 1 q E N Gr ) ( ), ( . 2 2 q NE q E E Gr Gr ≠               [5] 
Following hypothesis [5], the gap may be explained in terms of greater expectations of 
conformity in the constituent groups than in the recipient groups, for example: 
) ( . 1 q E E Gr ,  ) ( . 1 q E N Gr 5 ≥  and  4 ) ( ), ( . 2 2 ≤ q NE q E E Gr Gr           [5.a] 
The second hypothesis assumes equal expectations between groups, which means: 
H2.  ) ( . 1 q E E Gr ,  ) ( . 1 q E N Gr ) ( ), ( . 2 2 q NE q E E Gr Gr =               [6] 
In our framework, for example, H2 may be: 
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contribution  4 0 ≤ ≤ i q  (see next sections for details).    9
) ( . 1 q E E Gr ,  ) ( . 1 q E N Gr ) ( ), ( . 2 2 q NE q E E Gr Gr = 5 ≥             [6a] 
Nevertheless, different (or equal) expectations alone do not explain our gap, since it is necessary 
to express the relation between expectations and contributions.  
Assuming the relationship suggested by Offerman (1997), expectations determine contributions. 
Conformity may be intended as the positive correlation between conformity expectations (i.e. 
5 ) ( . ), ( . ≥ q N E q E E ) and conformity contributions ( 5 ≥ q ). To the contrary, a strategic use of 
conformity expectations means to observe (weak) free riding contributions. This may be 
expressed by the following specifications: 
5 ) ( . ), ( . ≥ q E N q E E  and  5 ≥ q  for conformity behaviour               [7] 
5 ) ( . ), ( . ≥ q E N q E E  and  4 0 ≤ ≤ i q  for strategic use                 [8] 
In exemplification [5a], the recipient groups should contribute less as the result of rational-
theoretical behaviour and not in a strategic meaning. In other words, the strategic use arises as 
exploitation of other positive contributions, but, when one expects others will also not 
contribute, the incentive to free ride is related to the pure condition of Marginal Per Capita 
Return (MPCR)  1 < MPCR  (see for example Sefton & Steinberg, 1996).  
 
3.   The Experiment  
3.1   Participants 
The global game is proposed to two groups, the experimental group and the control. Each 
consists of 14 members, chosen randomly (by voluntary subscription to the game) among 
students at the University of Trento (Italy). 
Before the game starts, each member is given a personal identity number (ID), in order to 
maintain anonymity condition during the entire game. Before making the first choice, all the 
instructions are read aloud by the experimenter and any doubts are clarified (see the Instructions 
in Appendix for details). 
3.2 Procedure 
The sequence of the game is the same as the standard version in Bortolami and Mittone (2009) 
except for the chat phase and the presence of the questionnaire to elicit participants’ 
expectations. 
Both groups play five rounds of the “Basic Game”. The BG belongs to the family of linear 
public good games with voluntary contribution mechanism, without infra-group   10
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where the initial endowment is 10 Euros. 
At the beginning of each round, people have to decide their personal choice of investment. At 
the end of each round, the participants see in their computer screen the total amount of the 
public good provided. 
The experimental group proceeds to the “Rule-Phase”, in which the sanctioning/rewarding rule 
is determined. The final rule is the output of five different phases in succession. Each phase is 
presented separately, and people do not know the specific content of each phase in detail, but 
they commonly know the total number of the phases and what each phase will regulate. At the 
beginning of the “Rule-Phase” they are informed that they have to decide about: 
1.   When the control will take place; 
2.   How many people will be controlled; 
3.   The type of punishment; 
4.   The possibility to reward; 
5.   The type of reward. 
Each phase consists of a discussion stage about a set of alternatives, followed by a voting 
referendum (with majority criterion). The chief difference of the software version is the 
introduction of the chat. We propose five “chat rooms”, one for each discussion phase. Any chat 
is open after the relative component options on the screen have been read. The specific chat 
room is opened for the same period as in the standard version discussion phase. People may 
decide to close the chat before the maximum time available has elapsed, by keying in “I’m 
ready to vote”. If all members are ready to vote, the chat is closed. When the chat is closed, it is 
not possible to enter again, and agents anonymously type their preferred option. The computer 
adds up all votes, displaying on each screen the option that obtained the majority of preferences. 
Any winning option is displayed on the lower part of the screen, in order to allow agents to 
monitor step-by-step the normative enactment.  
Finally, the experimental group and the control group play the five rounds of the BG again, but 
now knowing that the rule (BG+R) is in force.  
At the end of the first round, but before the communication of the aggregate level of 
contributions, both groups answer to the (remunerated) questionnaire. We structured our 
questions in two parts: the first concerns what individuals expect other players will contribute 
on average; the second concerns what individuals expect other players will expect. This 
distinction is an intermediate definition of expectations when compared to a pure Bicchieri’s   11
approach. In fact, our questionnaire regards both first and second order expectations about 
contributions, and conformity expectations due to the normative enactment. In other words, 
whenever players indicate how much they expect other players will contribute, they are also 
indicating the expected level of compliance. For instance, whenever they express expectations 
greater than the weak free riding threshold, they are implicitly assuming that other players will 
abide by the contributory norm. The two sets of questions concern the indication of both the 
expected average individual contribution, and the expected collective public good provided (by 
indicating the expected column in the payoff table). Following Gachter and Renner (2006) and 
Bicchieri and Xiao (2007), our questionnaire is paid, that is, players know they can win an extra 
monetary recompense for any correct prediction (at the end of the BG+R).  
The payoff function in the BG+R is the same of the standard version, that is: 
a) In case the player is audited (with probability
14 5
n r
p = ) his payoff becomes: 
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Where: 
r is the number of round controlled; n is the number of subjects controlled; C is the sum of all 
collective costs associated with the specific rule; R is the Reward; P is the Punishment.  
This general payoff function changes according to the options chosen by the subjects in the 
Rule Phase. Table 1 specifies what are the values associated with every option and the 
associated costs (see the Instructions in Appendix for details). 
For the sake of exposition suppose the subjects determine a rule combination with {1C; 2A; 3A; 
4A and 5E}. The associated values will be (r=2; n=1; R=0.02Q; P= πi). The specific payoff 
function would become: 
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Options and Associated Costs (c) 
Phase 
A B C  D  E 
1 
r = 1 (fixed at the 
beginning), 
c = 0.05Q 
r=1 (random), 
c = 0.03Q 
r = 2, 
c= 0.06 Q 
r = 3, 
c= 0.09Q 
r = 5, 
c=0. Q 










3  Yes No       
4  R= 0.02Q 
(windfall) 
R= 0.02Q 
(endogenous)     
5  P=0.02 Q  P=0.1πi 
P= α Q 
α =0.05Q, If qi =0 
α =0.04Q, If qi =1 
α =0.03Q, If qi =2 
α =0.02Q, If qi =3 
α =0.01Q, If qi =4 
P= β πi 
β=0.10, If qi =0 
β=0.08, If qi =1 
β=0.06, If qi =2 
β=0.04, If qi =3 
β=0.02, If qi =4 
P= πi 
 
Table 1. The parameters associated with the Rule’s options. 
 
The actual final payoff is determined according to individual personal performance. It is 
common knowledge (i.e. it is clearly stated in the instructions) that the payment will be 
provided at the end of the whole game (i.e. after the BG+R), by random extraction of one round 
for each game. This method is adopted in order to exclude any uncontrolled interference among 




4.1  The Comparison of the Basic Games  
As in the standard versions, the first comparison between groups concerns the BG. The aim is to 
provide the same game experience before proceeding to the BG+R. The BG prediction is that, 
on average, one observes weak levels of free riding in both groups. The first five rounds in 
Figure 1 show the aggregate level of public good provided in BG.   13
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Fig. 1. The level of total public good provided (Q) 
 
In a general game history perspective, the experimental-constituent group (henceforth G1) 
contributes on average about 28% of the maximum public good achievable, whereas the control-
recipient group (henceforth Gr2) contributes with 37%. Decay is present in the first group after 
the third round, where the amount of the final round is about the half of the first round. This 
decrement implies smaller individual average contributions in the first group than in the second 
group (where  8 . 2 1 = Gr q  Euros and  7 . 3 2 = Gr q  Euros). Despite this contributory difference, 
both groups confirm our prediction of a weak free riding contribution in BG.  
From an between-groups perspective, Gr1 and Gr2 are significantly different only in the last 
round, in which Gr2 provides a significantly greater level of aggregate public good (see Table 
2). Nevertheless, comparing the individual average contributions, Gr1 and Gr2 are not 
significantly different (Mann-Whitney one-tailed test,  210 . 0 = p ).  
 
Between-groups 
(Mann-Whitney Test)  R1-R1 R2-R2 R3-R3 R4-R4 R5-R5 
Gr1-Gr2  p= 0.559  p= 0.510  p= 0.869  p= 0.274  p= 0.026 
 
Table 2. Between-groups analysis. Round-wise comparisons (level of Q) in BG 
 
It is possible to distinguish the contributions of participants according to four classes of 
contribution: the strong free riding class ( 0 = i q ); the very weak free riding class ( 4 1 ≤ ≤ i q ); 
the half-endowment class ( 5 = i q ) and the contributory class ( 10 5 ≤ ≤ i q ). The Mann 
Whitney test confirms that no class is significantly different between-groups (respectively,   14
065 . 0 = p  for the strong free riding class;  655 . 0 = p  for the weak free riding class;  105 . 0 = p  
for the half-endowment class;  906 . 0 = p  for the contributory class).  
 
4.2   The Rule-Phase and the CMC by chat 
The constituent group proceeds with the normative enactment, choosing among the same 
alternatives as in the standard version.  
The final rule states that at the end of the game, one round is randomly selected by the 
computer. In this round, the computer selects one player. If she/he is a weak free rider, she/he 
will pay 10% of the payoff sanction. If the audited player is a contributor, she/he will receive 
2% of the public good, exogenously provided. The total cost of the norm enactment is 3.1% and 
it makes the Q columns in the payoff shift at most by one column to the left. 
This norm is very weak, the weakest when compared to standard version norms.  
Given the final options, the final payoff is differentiated among eventual contributor and 
eventual free rider: 
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4.3   The results of the Basic Game with Rule 
The results of the BG+R are very important, since they provide a direct test of the existence of 
the gap at the presence of a CMC by chat. We adopt the same efficiency indexes used in the 
standard version, that is, we proceed by comparing the total level of public good provided and 
the number of free riders after the normative enactment. 
 
4.3.1   The total level of public good provided and individual contributory averages 
The second five rounds in Figure 1 show the aggregate level of public good provided in both 
groups. It clearly emerges that the constituent group always contributes more than the recipient 
group. More interestingly, when compared to the BG in Figure 1, the groups reverse their   15
relationship. In BG the recipient group contributes more (but not significantly more) than the 
constituent group.  
A first important observation concerns the effect of the weak norm enactment. This norm 
does not improve the level of contribution in both groups. Gr1 provides, on average, 28% of 
maximum public good, whereas Gr2 achieves 10%. This means that the constituent group does 
not change the individual average contribution ( 78 . 2 1 = R Gr q  Euros) and Gr2 decreases the 
individual average contribution ( 07 . 1 2 = R Gr q  Euros) when compared to the case of the 
absence of the rule. For this purpose, from within-group perspective, with and without the norm, 
Gr1 does not significantly reduce its average contribution (Wilcoxon test,  997 . 0 = p ), whereas 
Gr2’s contribution significantly decreases (Wilcoxon test,  003 . 0 = p )  
Through between-groups round-wise comparison, we can test whether the software version 
displays the same participation effect observed in the standard version. In particular, we focus 
on the first round comparison, since we suppose that in such rounds the participation can 
display an unconditional effect (i.e. it is not associated with the game history). Table 3 confirms 
that the first, the fourth and the last rounds are statistically different, although not in a strong 
direction. These differences imply that the aggregate level of public good provided is 
statistically greater in Gr1 than in Gr2 ( 009 . 0 = p ). 
 
Between-groups 
(Mann-Whitney Test)  R1-R1 R2-R2 R3-R3 R4-R4 R5-R5 
Gr1-Gr2  p= 0.044  P= 0.148  p= 0.401  p= 0.008  p= 0.036 
 
Table 3. Between-groups analysis. Round-wise comparisons (level of Q) in BG+R 
 
We summarize these first observations in our first result: 
 
Result 1.  The insertion of a weak norm does not increase the levels of public good provided in 
both groups. Nevertheless, the constituent group provides, on average, a significantly greater 
level of public good than the recipient group. In a round-wise between-groups comparison, the 
maximum participation gap is observed in the fourth round, but also the first round is 
statistically (weakly) different. 
 
4.3.2   Contributory allocations and number of free riders 
To understand the source of the contributory gap between groups, we consider how individual 
allocations are distributed in the entire game history. Figure 2 shows two modal values: the first 
coincides with the strong free riding class and the second is the half-endowment contributions.   16
The strong free riding allocations correspond to about 44% of cases in Gr1 and 77% in Gr2. The 
half endowment class is about 34% of cases in Gr1 and 15% in Gr2. In particular, in the first 
round, the number of strong free riders in Gr1 corresponds to about a 50% of free riders in Gr2 
(35% and 64% respectively), whereas the number of half contributions in Gr1 is double that of 
the number in Gr2 (50% and 21% respectively). From this perspective, we can conjecture that 
the first round gap is due to the greater number of strong free riders in Gr2. 
Figure 3 aggregates the same information obtained in Figure 2, in order to highlight the 




















Figure 2. Frequencies for type of allocation (q) in the BG+R. 
 



















Figure 3. Frequencies for classes of contribution in the BG+R 
 
The Mann-Whitney test confirms that, from the game perspective, the number of free riders is 
significantly greater in Gr2 than in Gr1 ( 008 . 0 = p ). Moreover, the number of half-  17
contributions is significantly greater in Gr1 than in Gr2 ( 017 . 0 = p ). To the contrary, the weak 
free riding class and the contributory class are not significantly different (respectively, 
154 . 0 = p  and  106 . 0 = p ). These observations are summarized in our second result: 
 
Result 2. This weak sanctioning norm is not able to repress the number of free riders. 
Nevertheless, the number of strong free riders is significantly smaller in the constituent group 
than in the recipient one. Furthermore, Gr1 displays a significantly greater number of half 
endowment contributions than Gr2. 
 
4.4 Expectations  analysis 
Table 4 provides a first within-group comparison in terms of collective average contributions, 
empirical and normative expectations. Empirical and normative individual expectations do not 
differ significantly in both groups (Wilcoxon test  096 . 0 = p  in Gr1 and  157 . 0 = p  in Gr2). The 
Spearman correlation test supports the consistency of the expectations’ direction in both group, 
that is, empirical and normative expectations are strongly positively correlated. Moreover, in 
Gr1 individual expectations are positively and significantly related to individual contributions. 
To the contrary, in Gr2 this relationship is weaker and not significant (Table 5). 
 
Group Average 
( r1 BG+R)  q E.E  N.E. 
Gr1  3.85 4.57 5.14 
Gr2  1.4 2.5 2.7 
 
Table 4. Group average contributions and expectations 
 
















Table 5. Spearman Correlation test within-groups 
 
We notice that the constituent group presents, on average, greater empirical and normative 
expectations. The Mann Whitney test confirms that both expectations are significantly different 
between-groups ( 012 . 0 = p  for E.E and  003 . 0 = p  for N.E). This is a very important result, 
since we obtain a first empirical support for the hypotheses in Section 2.2.    18
Given the strong correlation between expectations and their common direction, we proceed 
to consider only the empirical expectations. Figures 4 and 5 show that the weak norm causes 
different empirical expectations between groups. The recipient group expects prevalently weak 
free riding contributions, whereas the constituent group mainly expects the conformity class. 
Figure 5 highlights that the contributory composition within-group is reversed in the between-
groups comparison. In fact, the contributory class is 64% in Gr1 and 29% in Gr2, whereas the 





















Figure 4. Empirical Expectations between groups 
 
















6≤ q ≤10 Gr1
6≤ q ≤10 Gr2
 
Figure 5. Empirical Expectations for Contributory Classes 
 
These results support hypothesis H1 (5), that is, empirical and normative expectations have the 
same direction within-groups, but they significantly differ between-groups. In particular, we 
may specify Hypothesis 1 in the same way as expressed in (5.a):   19
5 . . 1 1 ≥ = Gr Gr E N E E  and 
4 . . 2 2 ≤ = Gr Gr E N E E  
In order to understand the “use” of such expectations, we consider how contributions are related 
to expectations. As exposed in Section 2.2, the strategic use of expectation arises when 
individual expectation belongs to the contributory class but the effective contribution is in weak 
(strong) free riding class. Figures 6 and 7 provide within-group analysis of the strategic use of 
expectations. The perfect application of strategic use is really marginal in both groups, since it is 
applicable only to one player in Gr1 (subject 10) and 2 subjects in Gr2 (subjects 1 and 10). 
Nevertheless, the constituent group has greater expectations of conformity and positive answers 
to such expectations (confirmed by the positive and significant Spearman index in Table 5). To 
the contrary, the recipient group has less conformity expectations and it contributes with 
prevalently strong free riding allocations.  























Figure 6. Strategic use of Expectations in the constituent group (Gr1) 
 






















Figure 7. Strategic use of Expectations in the recipient group (Gr2C)   20
In Gr1 strong free riding expectations do not coincide with null contributions, although the 
latter mostly belong to the weak free riding class (except for player 11). In Gr2 the opposite 
behaviour occurs, that is, the greatest part of strong free riding allocations matches positive 
expectations of others.  
Our results confirm that participating to a normative enactment positively affects conformity 
expectations. More importantly, the constituent group does not exploit such greater expectations 
in a strategic sense. This may suggest that people positively answer to these expectations by 
contributing more, i.e., they seem to be conditionally conformist. To the contrary, the recipient 
group not only does not expect group conformity, but it also free rides independently of any 




Our results confirm the presence of a behavioural gap due to the participation effect. Even 
adopting a CMC by chat, the constituent group contributes more than the recipient group. In 
order to perfectly isolate the effect of the CMC, we should compare the results of the software 
version to those of another standard version experiment with the same norm. Although there is 
no equal software-rule in the standard versions, we deem the present norm to be similar to the 
A-rule in Bortolami and Mittone (2009). In fact, both norms may be defined as weak 
sanctioning rules. Both experiments achieve a similar result, that is, the constituent groups 
contribute more, but the enacted norm is inefficient. Moreover, both recipient groups decrease 
their initial contributions (i.e. in BG) in the presence of an exogenous enactment. Therefore, we 
observe that a participation gap is generally present, independently of the type of norm (i.e. 
different weak norms). In contrast, the specific normative formulation may be responsible for 
the contributory differences between experiments A and that of the software. Although we are 
chiefly interested in participation effect realization (and, hence, independent of the final rule), 
we compare the efficiency associated with different formulations, between the standard version 
(A-rule) and this first software version (henceforth C-rule). Nevertheless, in order to single out 
which component may cause contributory differences, we should compare the components’ 
incidence one-by-one, ceteris paribus. On the contrary, C-rule and A-rule differ in two 
components, specifically, the number of players audited, and the type of sanction (but both 
norms determine the sanction as percentages on free-rider payoff). Provided that Gr2A and 
Gr2C have experienced the same free riding extent
6, the problem of different component 
                                                 
6 The Mann-Whitney test confirms that Gr2A and Gr2C are not significantly different in their BGs. 
Nevertheless, the only significant difference is in the first round-wise comparison (p= 0.015). Other   21
incidence is completely excluded, since also the BG+R comparisons show the absence of any 
significant difference (see Table 6). 
 
Between-groups 
(Mann-Whitney Test)  R1-R1 R2-R2 R3-R3 R4-R4 R5-R5 
Gr2A-Gr2C  p= 0.679  p= 0.818  p= 0.747  p= 0.628  p= 0.730 
 
Table 6  Between-groups analysis. Round-wise comparisons (level of Q) in BG+R(A-C) 
 
These results suggest that, despite the presence of different weak components, the participation 
effect is found equally in the software version and in the standard experiment A. Moreover, we 
reassert that weak norms do not improve contributions, but the constituent groups contribute 
less inefficiently. This is realized independently of the communication medium adopted, 
suggesting the dominance of communication per se.  
It remains to be explained why the participation gap is still realized in the software version. 
The analysis of the expectations provides a first (partial) explanation of our contributory 
differences between groups. We observe that empirical and normative expectations have the 
same direction in both groups, providing a first answer to Bicchieri and Xiao’s (2007) open 
question. The study of these authors regards a dictator game, but they ask whether in public 
good games these expectations are consistent or whether, on the contrary, the incentive to free 
ride is predominant. Although both groups present expectation consistency, we find that 
participating in the enactment process achieves significantly greater expectations than in the 
recipient group. More importantly, the constituent group does not exploit such greater 
expectations. As we stated previously (see Section 2.2), greater expected positive contributions 
should theoretically stimulate free riders to defect. On the contrary, Gr1 replies positively to 
such expectations by contributing in the same direction. This observation is supported by our 
data, since expectations and contributions are strongly and significantly related in the 
constituent group. The use of lower expectations in the recipient group suggests a “rational 
reply”. In other words, players do not expect the conformity of the others; therefore, any 
positive contribution that they should exploit is lacking. Moreover, they contribute 
independently of any expectation of the others, leading to the theoretical prediction of strong 
free riding contributions. We cannot assert the general absence of strategic use in the recipient 
group, since our results are related to this weak norm formulation. In fact, we cannot exclude 
that severe norms would lead to different results. In other words, in the presence of strong rules, 
                                                                                                                                               
rounds (Rn) do not show any significant difference between groups (specifically, p=0.147 in R2; p= 0.214 
in R3; p= 0.080 in R4; p= 0.854 in R5). Moreover, there is no difference in the total level of public good 
provided in the game history (p=0.117).   22
people may expect greater contributions than those expected with C-rule; therefore, the 
incentive to free ride is effectively realized. The new results should be compared to hypotheses 
H1 and H2, but now the concrete existence of free riding incentive should be compared, in 
particular, to specification [7] or [8]. 
In spite of the above considerations, our results neither explain why participation generates 
greater expectations, nor why the constituent group does not use these expectations 
strategically. It looks as if the constituent group displays conditional conformity, that is, people 
may comply because they expect other players to abide by the contributory norm. This provides 
indirect support to Tyran and Feld’s (2006) definition of conditional contributions in the 
presence of a mild law. As in that study, our data also reinforce some undetected behavioural 
dynamics in the presence of inefficient sanctioning rules. Probably, the participation gap is also 
related to direct involvement in the enactment process, which may generate inner (positive) 
group dynamics. For instance, the presence of the voting mechanism may represent a sort of 
behavioural anchoring for BG+R contributions. Nevertheless, people acknowledge the 
weakness of the norm, so they expect, at most, contributions that avoid the application of the 
norm (i.e. the half endowment allocation).  
 
6. Conclusions 
This experiment is the first session of our software version, which confirms the presence of the 
participation gap using a CMC by chat. From this perspective, the role of communication per se 
seems to dominate the choice of the medium adopted, confirming previous experimental results 
(Bochet et al. 2006).  
Although this experiment provides interesting results, we are aware of several important 
limitations, regarding both the confirmation of the behavioural gap between groups, and the role 
of expectations. First of all, this is only the first experiment with the software version. We 
confirm the correctness of the BG structure by comparing the contributory range obtained in the 
standard and the software versions. In both versions, we obtain significant levels of weak free 
riding. In order to more firmly confirm the result of the BG+R, we should compare the same 
norm. Nevertheless, we obtain that similar weak norms have the same effect in terms of 
efficiency. This validates the hypothesis that the participation gap is not merely casual in the 
software version.  
Secondly, we test the role of expectations in a very small number of observations, and only 
for the first round. Future investigations should be addressed to replicate this avenue with more 
experimental groups, and also throughout the general game- history perspective.    23
Finally, we are mainly interested in normative enactment with a collective dimension, rather 
than from an individual perspective. In this regard, we have not carried out a deep within-group 
analysis. Nevertheless, our first results suggest the presence of a conditional conformity (group) 
effect as a good candidate to explain the participation gap. This provides indirect support to 
Tyran’s and Feld definition of conditional contributions in the presence of a mild law (see Tyran 
& Feld, 2006). 
In any case, further research is required, not only to replicate this software version, but also 
to verify whether participation implies a greater level of expectations, independently of the 
effective (weak or severe) norm enacted. Therefore, part of the questions presented in Bortolami 
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(This is a translation of the original Italian version) 
Introduction 
[In brackets the variations for the second group] 
 
Welcome and thank you for your participation 
With this game you can earn an amount of money, which depends both on your decisions and on what 
other players will decide. 
Please read carefully the following instructions. If you have any questions, please raise your hand and an 
experimenter will clarify your doubts.  
Throughout the whole game, you are not allowed to communicate. The violation of this rule leads to the 
exclusion from the experiment and from all payments. 
To ensure your anonymity, you will play using your ID. Nobody will be able to trace your personal 
identity from your decisions. Please, key in your ID whenever required. 
This game consists of three separate parts, which will be presented in sequence. 
1.  Basic Game. This is the baseline game of the entire experiment. It consists of 5 independent 
stages (rounds).  
2.  Rule-Game.  In this part you and other players will decide a rule, by means of a specific 
procedure of discussion and voting [2. Chat]. 
3.  Basic Game with rule. You will play the Basic Game with the norm. [3. Again the Basic Game 
with a change]. 
The payoff table is the same for all participants, 14 players including yourself. This table will help you to 
make your choices. The instructions about the payoff table will be given in the next steps. The 
instructions for the Rule-Game [Chat] will be provided after the Basic Game. 
At the end of the experiment you will be paid in cash. 
 
Basic Game 
The decision situation 
You have an endowment of 10 Euros, that you can invest. You can decide to invest between two different 
funds, called Private Fund and Collective Fund, respectively.  
You decide how many Euros to allocate to the different funds. Any combination is acceptable, provided 
that your digits are integer numbers in the range 0 to 10 (included), and that the sum of the amounts 
invested is 10 Euros.  
In general: 
-  Any Euros spent in the Private Fund guarantees you will receive at least the same amount. Examples: 
if you decide to invest 10 Euros, you will receive at least 10 Euros; if you invest 8 Euros you will 
receive at least 8 Euros.  
-  The Collective Fund pays a variable return, which depends on the amount present in the Collective 
Fund itself. The amount in the Collective Fund is the sum of all contributions that you and other   26
players will decide to invest in this fund. The greater the amount present in the Collective Fund, the 
more money the fund will return.  
The Computer calculates how many Euros are invested in the Collective Fund; it applies a rate of 
0.8%, and such increased amount will be equally divided into 14 parts, one for each player. You will 
receive 1/14 of the Collective Fund, independently of your initial investment in this fund.  
Only in the case when the Collective fund reaches 140 Euros, does it return 15 Euros to each player. 
Example: you decide to invest 4 Euros in the Collective Fund. As soon as other players enter their 
investment, the computer will calculate the total amount present in the Collective Fund and its 
relative interest. For instance, if the Collective Fund has 100 Euros, the computer will announce 108 
Euros, which divided into 14 equal parts, will provide 7.7 Euros to each player.  
The real values obtained from the investment will be approximated (example 1,12 becomes 1; 2,49 
becomes 2.5; 3,39 becomes 3.5 and so on) 
 
Your payoff 
Your final payoff is the sum of your initial investment in the private Fund, plus 1/14 of the Collective 
Fund.  
Example: you invest 4 Euros in the Collective Fund and, consequently, the remaining 6 Euros are 
invested in the Private Fund. If the computer announces 100 Euros, your payoff will be 14 Euros: 
14 7 . 13
14
) 08 . 0 1 ( 100
6 → =
+
+  Euros 
From the Private Fund    From the Collective Fund 
  (6  Euros)    (7.7  Euros) 
 
The Payoff Table 
The payoff table helps you to understand your possible payoff.  
In the first column you find any possible allocation to the Collective Fund (from 0 to 10 Euros included). 
In the first line you find all possible levels of Collective Fund that the computer may announce (from 0 to 
140s Euros included). 
Your possible payoff corresponds to the intersection of your investment choice in the Collective Fund, 
with the column of the possible amount announced by the computer. Any cell already includes the sum of 
your investment returns, from both the private and the collective investment. You can check that the 
payoff in the example above is really the intersection of line 4 Euros, with column 100 Euros (see Fig.1). 
The announcement is made after you and other players key in your investment choice. The announcement 
of the Collective Fund, and your relative payoff, indicates the end of a round. Your initial investment, the 
Collective Fund and your payoff are recorded at the top of the computer screen (see Fig. 2). 
 








0-13  14-27  28-41  42-55  56-69  70-83  84-97  98-111  112-125  126-139  140 
0  10.5 11.5 12.5 13.5 14.5 15.5 16.5  18  19  20   
1  9  10.5 11.5 12.5 13.5 14.5 15.5  17  18  19   
2  8 9  10  11.5  12.5  13.5  14.5  16  17  18  
3  7 8 9  10  11.5  12.5  13.5  15  16  17  
4  6 7 8 9  10  11.5  12.5  14  15  16  
5  5.5  6 7 8 9  10  11.5  13  14  15  
6  4.5  5.5  6 7 8 9  10  11.5  13  14  
7  3.5 4.5 5.5  6  7  8  9 10.5 12  13   
8  2.5 3.5 4.5 5.5  6  7  8  9.5  10.5 12   
9  2  2.5 3.5 4.5 5.5  6  7  8.5 9.5 11   
10  1  2  2.5 3.5 4.5 5.5 6.5 7.5 8.5 9.5 15 
Fig.1 Payoff Table 
The procedure of the Basic Game 
At the beginning, the computer will ask you to key in your ID. After that, click OK. 
From here on, all procedures will be computerized. Please, key in your ID whenever required.    27
After the first Collective Fund announcement, you will have to make four more choices. All rounds are 
independent of the others, that is, at the beginning of a new round you always have 10 Euros available.  
The Basic Game will end after the fifth announcement is made. The payment for this game is made at the 
end of the experiment, by randomly extracting one round among the five you have played. During the 
entire game you are not allowed to communicate. 
 
 
Fig.1 Basic Game’s Computer screen (Italian version) 
Control Questions 
Please answer the following questions: 
1)  If you decide to invest 0 Euro in the Private Fund, and the computer announces 70 Euros, what is 
your final payoff? _________ 
2)  If you decide to invest 0 Euro in the Collective Fund, and the computer announces 70 Euros, 
what is your final payoff? _________ 
3)  If you decide to invest 3 Euros in the Private Fund, and the computer announces 12 Euros, what 
is your final payoff? __________ 
4)  If you decide to invest 3 Euros in the Collective Fund, and the computer announces 12 Euros, 
what is your final payoff? ___________ 
Are there any questions? 
Rule-Phase 
The aim of this game is to create a rule that significantly reduces the individual investments in the 
Collective Fund from 0 to 4 Euros included, that is, to promote the investment from 5 to 10 Euros 
included. 
This rule will be inserted in your next Basic Game. 
The rule consists of 5 components, which decide: 
-  When the control takes place; 
-  The number of players that are audited; 
-  The possibility to reward people who contribute with more than 4 Euros included; 
-  The type of reward; 
-  The type of sanction to be applied to players who contribute from 0 to 4 Euros included. 
The game consists of a sequence of five phases, one for each rule component.  
All components have a set of alternatives (options). As you will see, these options may be related to some 
costs.  
You can briefly discuss the set of options with other players. To communicate, you will use a chat, where 
your name will be kept anonymous by means of your ID. 
At the end of the chat, you will proceed to the voting stage. Your vote is free and anonymous.   28
The winning option for each phase is the one which has the majority of preferences. If two options have 
the same number of preferences, you will vote again. If there is parity another time, the computer will 
randomly select the winning option. 
After the rule is completed, you will play the Basic Game, being aware now that the norm is actually in 
force. 
Please note that: 
-  The computer will present all phases, one at a time; 
-  After you read all the available options, the chat will be open for a maximum period of time indicated 
by the computer. 
-  When the available time elapses, the chat will be closed and it will not be possible to enter it again. 
-  You can vote only when the chat is closed 
-  Any winning option will be announced by the computer.  
-  Any winning option will be displayed on the lower part of the computer screen. 
The Chat-rooms 
The communication within the chat is NOT free. You can exchange opinions about any single option, its 
advantages/disadvantages, and so on, but it is strictly forbidden to communicate the amount you will 
contribute in subsequent rounds. 
The chat is open for a period, which the computer will announce at the beginning of each phase. It is 
possible to close the chat before the expiry of the available period. This may occur when you and all other 
players deem the information exchanged in the chat to be sufficient. The chat will be closed when all of 
you will key in “I’m ready to vote”. In any case, the chat will be closed as soon as the available time is 
over. 
Whenever you express personal opinions about what other players have already said, please do not forget 
to refer to those particular players. In this regard, please key in “I agree/I do not agree with ID (and the 
number) …” 
When the chat is closed, you will proceed to the voting stage.  
  Are there any questions? 
Phases 
 
First Phase. “When to control” Component. (Discussion phase: maximum 8 minutes) 
In order to significantly reduce the number of allocations from zero to four Euros (included), how 
often is it necessary to audit? 
Options: 
A ⃞ Establish now the selected audited round. If A is the winning option, you will propose the round you 
prefer to be controlled. This option costs 5% of the collective final fund. 
B ⃞ One round randomly extracted at the end of the game. This control will cost 3% of the collective 
final fund 
C ⃞ At the end of each round. This control will cost 40% of the collective final fund. 
D ⃞ Two rounds randomly extracted at the end of the game. This control will cost 6% of collective fund.  
E ⃞ Three rounds randomly extracted at the end of the game. This control will cost 9% of the collective 
final fund. 
It is very important to know that: 
Your effective payoff will always be determined by randomly extracting ONE round at the end of the 
Basic Game with Rule, BUT: 
If the winner option is A or C, your payoff will coincide with the one of a randomly extracted round. 
If the winner option is B, the payoff coincides with the controlled round. 
If the winner option is D or E, your payoff will coincide with one round randomly extracted among that 
set of rounds. 
 
Second Phase. “Number of players to be audited” Component. (Discussion phase: maximum 5 minutes). 
In order to significantly reduce the number of allocations between zero and four Euro (included), 
how many players should be audited? 
Options: 
A ⃞ One player (this option costs 0.1% of the final Collective Fund)   29
B ⃞ Two players (this option costs 0.2% of the final Collective Fund)  
C ⃞ Three players (this option costs 0.3% of the final Collective Fund) 
D ⃞ Five players (this option cost 0.5% of the final Collective Fund) 
 
Third Phase. “Reward possibility” Component. (Discussion phase: maximum 4 minutes). 
Do you want to provide rewards to audited player(s), who will have contributed with more than 
four Euros? 
Options: 
A ⃞ Yes 
B ⃞ No 
 
Fourth Phase. “Type of Reward” Component. (Discussion phase: maximum 5 minutes) 
The reward to the audited player(s) who has (have) contributed with more than four Euros, 
consists of 
Options: 
A  ⃞  A bonus coinciding with 2% of the Collective Fund. This amount will be paid without any 
implication to the Collective Fund provided. In other words, this bonus will be a windfall.   
B ⃞  A bonus coinciding with 2% of the Collective Fund. This amount will be paid by the audited 
player(s) if she/he is (they are) not contributor(s). In the case that the control does not reveal the presence 
of any non-contributor, this amount will be paid by all other uncontrolled players.  
 
Fifth Phase. “Type of Sanction” Component. (Discussion Phase: maximum 8 minutes). 
What is the sanction to the audited member(s), in the case she/he has (they have) contributed from 
zero to four Euros (included)? 
Options: 
A monetary sanction equivalent to: 
A1 ⃞     2% of the net Collective Fund 
A2 ⃞    10% of her/his (their) payoff 
A proportional monetary sanction, related to the degree of her/his (their) level of non-contribution. 
Options: 
B1 ⃞    a percentage of the net Collective Fund. In particular, if q=0 she/he pays 5% of the fund; if q=1 
she/he pays 4% of the fund; if q=2 she/he pays 3% of the fund; if q=3 she/he pays 2% of the 
fund; if q=4 she/he pays 1% of the fund. 
B2 ⃞    a percentage of her/his payoff. In particular, if q=0 she/he pays 10% of her/his payoff; if q=1 
she/he pays 8% of her/his payoff; if q=2 she/he pays 6% of her/his payoff; if q=3 she/he pays 
4% of her/his payoff; if q=4 she/he pays 2% of her/his payoff. 
 C ⃞     She/he will completely lose her/his payoff.   30
 




In the chat you can communicate with other group members about the significance of the game you have 
just played. In the chat you will be identified by your personal ID, keeping your personal anonymity.  
The communication in the chat is NOT free. You can only exchange opinions about the game you have 
already played, in terms of significance, possible advantages or disadvantages related to the payoff table, 
and only in order to understand how the game has worked.  
It is strictly forbidden to communicate what you will contribute in subsequent rounds.  
The chat is open for a period that the experimenter will soon communicate. It is possible to close the chat 
before the expiry of the period available. This may occur when you and all other players deem the 
information exchanged in the chat to be sufficient. The chat will be closed when all of you key in “I’m 
ready to play”. In any case, the chat will be closed as soon as the available time is over. 
Whenever you express personal opinions about what other players have already said, please do not forget 
to refer to those particular players. In this regard, please key in “I agree/I do not agree with ID (and the 
number) …” 
When the chat is closed, you will proceed to the second stage. Remember that your investment choices 
are always free and anonymous. 
Second Game 
(Recipient Group) 
This game is exactly the same as the first one, with only one difference. Now the following rule is 
enforced in the game: 
“………..” 
Questionnaire 
Before the computer announcement, please complete the following questions. Any correct estimate will 
be paid 1.5 Euros in addition to your final payoff. 
ID………………………………. 
 
These estimates regard ONLY the next round of the game. You have to predict what other players will 
contribute in the first round, not in other rounds.  
The real values obtained at the end of the round will be approximated to the closest integer (example 1,12 
becomes 1; 2,49 becomes 2; 3,51 becomes 4 and so on). 
YOUR ESTIMATES 
1) In your opinion, what will other players contribute (on average) to the Collective Fund?   31
0 Euro  □              6 Euros  □ 
1 Euro  □              7 Euros  □ 
2 Euros  □              8 Euros  □ 
3 Euros  □              9 Euros  □ 
4 Euros  □              10 Euros  □ 
5 Euros  □       
2) In your opinion, how many players (excluding yourself) will contribute to the Collective Fund 
with...? (write the number of players beside the corresponding allocations. Remember: the sum must 
yield 13) 
0 Euro  ____              6 Euros  _______ 
1 Euro  ____              7 Euros  _______ 
2 Euros  ______              8 Euros  _______ 
3 Euros  ____              9 Euros  ______ 
4 Euros  ____              10 Euros  ____ 
5  Euros  ____       
3) In your opinion, in which column will the Collective Fund be announced?  
a) 0-13 Euros  □    g)  84-97  Euros   □ 
b) 14-27 Euros  □    h)  98-111  Euros   □ 
c) 28-41 Euros  □    i)  112-125  Euros   □ 
d) 42-55 Euros  □    j)  126-139  Euros   □ 
e) 56-69 Euros  □    k)  140  Euros   □ 
f) 70-83 Euros  □     
 
OTHERS’ ESTIMATES (In your opinion)  
Each member in your group has estimated the contributions in the next round as you have done. Please 
assess now the total of the amounts the other 13 group members stated as their estimate. 
4) In your opinion, what did other players state they expect about the average contribution to the 
Collective Fund? 
0 Euro  □              6 Euros  □ 
1 Euro  □              7 Euros  □ 
2 Euros  □              8 Euros  □ 
3 Euros  □              9 Euros  □ 
4 Euros  □              10 Euros  □ 
5 Euros  □       
5) In your opinion, in which column do you believe other players expect the Collective Fund to be 
placed?  
a) 0-13 Euros  □     g)  84-97  Euros   □ 
b) 14-27 Euros  □    h)  98-111  Euros   □ 
c) 28-41 Euros  □    i)  112-125  Euros   □ 
d) 42-55 Euros  □    j)  126-139  Euros   □ 
e) 56-69 Euros  □    k)  140  Euros   □ 
f) 70-83 Euros  □     
 